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In Avant v. Johnson1 the Court upheld the lower court's
finding that the plaintiff had failed to prove his allegations of
fraud, misrepresentations or undue influence, and its refusal
to set aside the deed involved in the dispute. On the question
of costs, however, the Court, reaching its conclusion on the
equities of the case, ordered the defendants to pay such ex-
penses.
Receivers
Vasiliades v. Vasiliades2 was an action for partition of the
decedent's estate. The plaintiff sought a portion of the estate
on the basis of her being his widow by virtue of a Greek marri-
age ceremony. A receiver was appointed by the lower court
based on the allegation of the complaint. Later it developed
that the courts of the Kingdom of Greece held the marriage of
plaintiff to decedent to be null and void from its inception.
The defendants then moved to dismiss the receiver which
was granted by the lower court. A motion was made by plain-
tiff to obtain receiver's costs, compensation and attorney's
fees. This motion was denied by the court.
On appeal the Supreme Court held that the lower court
was correct in dismissing the receiver, this being a dis-
cretionary matter for the court, the same as that of appoint-
ing a receiver. It also held that receiver's 'cost, compensation,
and attorney's fees were properly denied as such expenses
could not be charged against the adversaries' portions of the
properties involved. Actually the receiver never took posses-
sion of any property since the defendants posted bond to pre-
vent it.
Patents
An action for a declaratory judgment interpreting a con-
tract was brought in Taco Corp. v. Hudson.3 Plaintiff was
*Member of law firm of Urner, Farlow & McCrackin, Myrtle Beach;
A.B., 1951, Wofford College; LL.B., 1955, University of South Carolina.
1. 231 S. C. 119, 97 S. E. 2d 396 (1957).
2. 231 S. C. 366, 98 S. E. 2d 810 (1957).
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the successor of another company which had contracted with
the defendant patent licensor. The contract terms, inter alia,
were to the effect that the plaintiff "shall pay to the [defend-
ant] 2732% of the gross royalties received during that year
from sub-licensees." Under another provision the plaintiff
was given the right to sub-license the patent involved.
Plaintiff was also the successor to a franchise contract
entered into between V. K. Dell and the prior company. Dell
was given a large area in which to operate and provided for
the sub-licensing of plants operated by him. For the fran-
chise agreement, Dell guaranteed certain annual payments to
the prior company in the event royalty payments did not
reach said amounts. Apparently, no plants were licensed in
the franchise area. In 1955, Dell made the annual payment
pursuant to the agreement, there being no royalty payments
by him. The defendant demanded 271% of said amount,
claiming that this sum constituted royalties under the sub-
licenses.
"It seems clear that defendant is not entitled to 27Y2% of
the payments made by Dell for the reason, first, such pay-
ments are not payments received from sub-licenses and second,
such payments are not royalties within the meaning of the
agreement between [the parties]." These were the words of
the lower court which further held that to call the payments
made by Dell a "royalty" would not be proper in view of the
definition of "royalty". It relates to revenues based on use,
and in this case there was no use of the patent.
Judge Martin's order was adopted as the opinion of the
Supreme Court, and both decisions seem correct.
State Fair-Trade Laws
Our Supreme Court in Rogers-Kent, Inc. v. General Electric
Co.4 considered the State Fair-Trade Act 5 and concluded that
it was unconstitutional insofar as it applies to nonsigners
because to them it constituted a deprivation of property with-
out due process of law, this being in violation of Section 5,
Article I of the Constitution of South Carolina, 1895.
While this decision is in line with the minority view on
state fair-trade laws, it still appears to be the correct solution
to the controversy. For those interested in and concerned with
4. 231 S. C. 636, 99 S. E. 2d 665 (1957).
5. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 66-91 through 66-95.
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fair-trade laws, it is suggested that this case be thoroughly
digested.
Sovereign Immunity
Brame v. Garner6 was an action against the Fort Jackson
Officers' Mess and one of its members. The Mess objected to
the jurisdiction of the court as to it on the ground that it was
immune to civil suit since it was an instrumentality of the
United States and such immunity had not been waived. This
was sustained by the trial court to which approval was given
by the Supreme Court. The South Carolina statutes concern-
ing suits against unincorporated associations could have no
application as the Mess was immune from suit under federal
law.
Real Party in Interest
An action for an accounting was brought in Wise v. Picow1
by the person for whose benefit a contract had been entered
into by others. The master found as a fact that the plaintiff
was the real party in interest and entitled to bring the action.
His report was approved by the circuit judge and affirmed
by the Court on appeal.
The defendants objected to the allowance of interest by the
circuit judge but this also was overruled as no such objection
was made to the master's report.
Demurrer
The ancillary receiver of a foreign insurance company
brought an action for an accounting in Wallace v. Timmons s
against the defendant as executrix and as an individual. In
the complaint were allegations that the defendant's decedent
had held funds as trustee for the insurance company, and
that the defendant was the sole distributee of the decedent.
The action was commenced several years after the death of the
decedent.
A demurrer was interposed by the defendant and the
special judge sustained it. Two of his grounds were: (2) that
the claim is barred by sections 19-473 and 19-474 of the Code;
and (3) that it is barred by laches.
On appeal the Supreme Court held that Sections 19-473 and
19-474 were not applicable to the case as the allegations were
6. 232 S. C. 157, 101 S. E. 2d 292 (1957).
7. 232 S. C. 237, 101 S. E. 2d 651 (1958).
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that a trust was involved and not the claims of creditors of an
estate. It was also of the opinion that the trial court erred in
invoking the question of laches of its own motion in this par-
ticular case. Of course, the trial court can invoke the doc-
trine of laches in proper cases even though not pleaded.
Mandamus
Mandamus proceedings were instituted in Thomas v. Holis9
to compel the State Educational Finance Commission to dis-
burse funds to a school district for construction of a new school
building. Negotiations between the school trustees and the
State Educational Finance Commission took place over a
period of almost four years before this suit was commenced.
From the facts it was ascertained that the commission never
unconditionally approved the building of a new high school on
the site purchased by the Board of Trustees, even though it
had authorized the disbursement to purchase the site itself.
Even if the latter were construed as an approval, the Court
stated that it was ".... Doubtful whether the Finance Com-
mission would be precluded from withdrawing such approval
... The paramount consideration is the best interest of the
School District."
The Court further stated that in proper cases mandamus
would lie to compel an agency to exercise its judgment or dis-
cretion. However, in this case no such relief was sought in
the petition; neither was the issue passed upon by the trial
court nor raised by the exceptions.
Betterments
Dunham v. Davis10 was an action to recover real estate.
The case had been appealed before on another question and was
remanded "for trial of the issue under the pleadings relating
to the note and mortgage hereinbefore mentioned, including
the accounting involved, as directed in the order of the cir-
cuit court." The latter court's order related to improvements
to the realty.
The master, after several hearings, rendered his report in
which he recommended that defendant be allowed $10,000.00
as "equitable compensation" for what he had done in super-
vision and protection of the timber, and recommended certain
9. 232 S. C. 330, 102 S. E. 2d 110 (1958).
10. 232 S. C. 175, 101 S. E. 2d 278 (1957).
1958]
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amounts for other specific items, one being $5,476.35 for ex-
penditures involved in enhancing the value of the land
caused by the operations involved in clearing it.
On appeal, the Supreme Court adopted Judge Baker's order
as the opinion of the Court. In Judge Baker's order, he held
that the $10,000.00 recommended by the master as "equitable
compensation" was not proper as nothing which was done fell
within the betterment statutes, and that the method to be
used in determining the compensation for clearing the farm
land was the enhancement in value. The case was referred
back to the master on this latter point because there was in-
sufficient evidence to determine the enhanced value.
Pleadings
Barnwell Production Credit Ass'n. v. Hartzogn was an
action on a promissory note secured by tivo mortgages, one
covering real estate and the other certain chattels. There was
an allegation in the complaint to the effect that plaintiff was
entitled to possession of the chattels and demand for such
possession was made in the prayer of the complaint. The
answer by the Hartzogs contained a plea of fraud and deceit
and a counterclaim based on the same. A demand for a trial
by jury was made by the Hartzogs based on the pleas con-
tained in their answer and also on the claim that the complaint
stated a cause of action in claim and delivery in regard to
the chattel mortgage.
Judge Henderson decided that the complaint stated a cause
of action for foreclosure of the mortgage in equity, refused
a trial by jury, and ordered a reference upon plaintiff's mo-
tion. His decisions were affirmed by the Supreme Court which
held that a court, in construing a complaint suggestive of
more than one theory, should sustain the theory intended by
the pleader if it is supported by the allegations and should
reject as surplusage allegations not in harmony therewith.
It was almost academic then for the Court to affirm the trial
judge's refusal of trial by jury since all issues of an equity
case should be tried in equity.
11. 231 S. C. 340, 98 S. E. 2d 835 (1957).
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